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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
*****
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS, an Idaho municipal corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho corporation, Defendant-Respondent,
*****
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
*****
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Bonneville County.
Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding.
*****
Randall D. Fife, Esq., and Michael A. Kirkham, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for
Appellant, City of Idaho Falls
B. J. Driscoll, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Respondent, H-K Contractors, Inc.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant/Respondent HK Contractors, Inc. (“HK”), largely agrees with the
Plaintiff/Appellant City of Idaho Falls’ (“City”) Statement of the Case. However, HK writes to
clarify a few items the City does not fairly represent from the record.
First, the City does not appeal from “an erroneous determination by the District Court that
Idaho’s governmental subdivisions are not part of the ‘state.’”1 More correctly, the City appeals
from the District Court’s application of the plain language of the statute of limitations found in
Idaho Code Section 5-216 to bar the City’s claims arising from a written contract.2 The District
Court concluded that Section 5-216 is unambiguous, and that redrafting the language as the City
suggested would be improper.3
Second, the City states that it “performed all of its obligations” under the parties’ Storm
Drainage Agreement (“Agreement”).4 However, the City had no obligations under the
Agreement.5
Third, the City implies that HK never provided the name of the “unnamed City official”
that notified HK that the City was not interested in acquiring HK’s property.6 However, HK
politely explained that then-City parks and recreation director David Christensen notified HK’s
then-president Brent Foster that the City was no longer interested in acquiring HK’s property.7
1

See p. 1 of Appellant’s Brief.
See R. Vol. I., pp. 73-75.
3
See R. Vol. I., pp. 73-75.
4
See p. 1 of Appellant’s Brief.
5
See R. Vol. I., pp. 13-14.
6
See p. 2 of Appellant’s Brief.
7
See R. Vol. I., p. 27.
2
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE CITY’S COMPLAINT BECAUSE
THE CITY’S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF IDAHO CODE
SECTION 5-216 AND NO EXEMPTION APPLIES.
A.

Standard Of Review.
In McCabe v. Craven, 145 Idaho 954, 956-957 (2008), this Court explained the proper

standard of review from an order granting a motion to dismiss and applying a statute of
limitations as follows:
“In reviewing the district court’s order granting the motion to dismiss, the
standard of review is the same as that used in summary judgment…The standard
of review on appeal from an order granting summary judgment is the same
standard that is used by the district court in ruling on the motion…Summary
judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and
admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
….
This Court freely reviews the legal issues related to the statute of
limitations.
(Quotations and internal citations omitted.)
B.

The Statute Of Limitations Is To Be Liberally Construed, While Exemptions To The
Statute Of Limitations Are To Be Strictly Construed.
The District Court correctly identified the rule set forth by this Court that “‘[t]he statute

of limitations is general, is to be liberally construed, and must be applied in all cases where an
exception is not specifically made. Statutes creating exemptions are to be strictly construed and
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will not be extended by implication.’”8 As explained below, the District Court adhered to this
rule in applying the statute of limitations to the City’s claims.
C.

Idaho Code Section 5-216 Applies To Bar The City’s Claims Arising From The Written
Storm Drainage Agreement.
Idaho Code Section 5-216 imposes a five-year limitation period for “[a]n action upon any

contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing.” Here, the District Court
correctly determined that the City’s claims for breach of contract and waste accrued on March 1,
2010, but the City did not file suit until November 22, 2016.9 As the City’s claims arise from the
written Storm Drainage Agreement, the District Court correctly concluded that the statute of
limitations in Section 5-216 applies to bar the City’s claims unless the City proves its claims are
exempt from the limitation.10
D.

The Exemption In Section 5-216 For Claims Brought In The Name Or For The Benefit
Of The State Does Not Apply To The Claims Brought By The City.
Idaho Code Section 5-216 provides an exemption from the five-year limitation period to

actions on a written contract, stating in pertinent part, “The limitations prescribed by this section
shall never apply to actions in the name or for the benefit of the state and shall never be asserted
nor interposed as a defense to any action in the name or for the benefit of the state…”
The District Court thoughtfully analyzed this language in Section 5-216 and concluded
that it did not exempt the City’s claims from the statute of limitations. The District Court

8

See R. Vol. I., p. 76 (quoting Mendini v. Milner, 47 Idaho 439 (1929) (cited with approval in Peterson v. Gentillon,
154 Idaho 184, 189 (2013)).
9
See R. Vol. I., p. 72.
10
See R. Vol. I., p. 72.
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rejected the City’s invitation to construe the reference to “the state” to include “the state and its
political subdivisions.” No such language exists in this section. Rather, the District Court
properly noted that the Idaho Legislature “has also been careful to specifically identify the state
and political subdivisions in certain legislation,” having made this distinction several times even
within the same Chapter 2, Title 5, Idaho Code.11 Section 5-218 expressly refers to “the state of
Idaho or any political subdivision thereof.” Section 5-247 expressly defines “governmental unit”
to include “[a] political subdivision of the state, including a municipality or county.” As the
District Court pointed out, “The statute at issue here, I.C. § 5-216, does not include such
language. However, the City would have the Court read into § 5-216 such language based on the
fact that some sections of the Idaho Constitution and the Idaho Code have included it.”12
Liberally construing the statute of limitations and strictly construing this exemption, the District
Court correctly applied the plain language of Section 5-216.
The District Court also properly rejected the City’s invitation to “harmoniously” construe
Section 5-216 to include cities. The City argued that in Bannock County v. Bell, 8 Idaho 1
(1901), this Court liberally construed the term “state” in the statute of limitation in Section 5-225
to include all government subdivisions. Based on this liberal construction in applying the statute
of limitation in Section 5-225 to a county, the City urged a “harmonious” interpretation of the
exemption in Section 5-216 to treat the “state” as including the City. However, this proposed
construction runs directly contrary to the express directive that only statutes of limitations (such

11
12

See R. Vol. I., p. 73 (italics in original).
See R. Vol. I., p. 73.
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as Section 5-225) be construed liberally and that exemptions (such as Section 5-216) be
construed strictly. See Mendini v. Milner, 47 Idaho 439, 276 P. 313, 314 (1929) (cited with
approval in Peterson v. Gentillon, 154 Idaho 184, 189 (2013)). Section 5-225 liberally applies all
of the statutes of limitations in Chapter 2, Title 5, to the state and its political subdivisions,
whereas Section 5-216 carves out a narrow exemption for the state in actions on a written
contract. There is nothing “jarring” or “unharmonious” in the District Court’s holding.13
The District Court focused on the plain, unambiguous language in Section 5-216 and
rejected the City’s argument that the legislature had intended “the state” to include political
subdivisions in Section 5-216, but had failed to actually include the language. The District Court
cited to this Court for the rule that “where the question is whether the legislature inadvertently
left language out of the statute, the missing language is not to be read into the statute by the
courts.”14
As further support for its conclusion, the District Court pointed out that the term “state”
does not apply to political subdivisions under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act.
Likewise, the District Court would not construe the term “state” to include political subdivisions
to extend the exemption provided in Section 5-216 to the City.15
The District Court also considered, and properly rejected, the City’s argument that the
phrase, “for the benefit of the state,” includes the City. The City laced together an argument that
because the City derived its authority from the state and sought to acquire HK’s property for

13
14

See p. 9 of Appellant’s Brief.
See R. Vol. I., p. 74 (citing Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Gooding City, 159 Idaho 84, 89 (2015)).
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some future public purpose, which would benefit the citizens of Idaho Falls, who also happen to
be citizens of the state of Idaho, then the City’s claims should be treated as being brought “for the
benefit of the state.”16 The District Court concluded that “[t]he City’s argument is an attempt to
circumvent the plain language of the statute” and “such a circumvention would result in any
entity or person, in any capacity, avoiding the statute of limitations simply because it can trace a
benefit of its claim to some resident of the state.”17 The District Court properly rejected the
City’s argument.
In considering the phrase, “for the benefit of the state,” this Court’s commentary in Bevis
v. Wright, 31 Idaho 676, 175 P. 815 (1918), is helpful. In Bevis, a county resident and taxpayer
challenged Nez Perce County’s authority to impose a tax to be used to promote the products and
industries of the county at exhibitions. Among other things, the taxpayer argued that the county
tax was actually “for the benefit of the state,” and therefore the tax should be made uniform
throughout the state. This Court rejected that argument and concluded that “[w]hile the state at
large might receive some benefit, the principal object sought to be obtained inures to the benefit
of the county itself.” 175 P. at 816. Here, the likelihood that the state might receive some
benefit from the City’s private contract for a gravel pit for storm water drainage for the
Kensington Park subdivision is even more tenuous. Clearly, the “principal object” of the Storm
Drainage Agreement inures to the benefit of the City, not to the state at large.

15

See R. Vol. I., pp. 74-75.
See R. Vol. I., p. 75.
17
See R. Vol. I., p. 76.
16
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E.

The City’s Claims Are Not Exempt From The Limitations Period Under Any Common
Law Theory.
In addition to the express exemption from the statute of limitations found in Section 5-

216, this Court has recognized a common law exemption from the statute of limitations where
the state, as trustee, is performing a high constitutional duty involving public property.
This Court applied this narrow exemption in State v. Peterson, 61 Idaho 50, 97 P.2d 603
(1939), allowing the state of Idaho’s action to recover public monies loaned from the public
school endowment fund created by the Idaho Constitution despite the running of the applicable
statute of limitations. The Court reasoned this exemption from the statute of limitations was
appropriate because “[t]he higher the sovereignty and the more sacred (not used in a religious
sense) and public the function involved the greater the reason for immunity” from the statute of
limitations defense. 97 P.2d at 605 (parenthetical in original). The claim in Peterson arose from
“the state as trustee performing a high constitutional public duty…the handling of [] public
school funds.” 97 P.2d at 606 (emphasis added). This Court did not bar the state’s claim
because “[t]he trust relationship here is of the highest order and should be protected to the
utmost.” Id. The state of Idaho is the highest sovereign. This particular duty was derived from
the Constitution, the highest and most “sacred” source of duty. Under these unique
circumstances, the Court exempted the claim from the statute of limitations.
The City attempted to analogize its private contract claims against HK to the state’s high
constitutional claim in Peterson, but the District Court easily and correctly distinguished the two.
The Peterson case involved an action to recover money loaned to private individuals from the
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constitutionally established public school endowment fund, whereas the City’s action involves no
transfer of public property at all. The District Court noted, “The City did not lend public money
or property to H-K. In fact, the contract between the parties called for H-K’s conveyance of it’s
[sic] own private property to the City.”18 By applying the statute of limitations to the City’s
claims, “H-K simply retains private property which it already owned, not public property the City
holds in trust.” HK never received any public property or public funds.
The Peterson case involved the highest sovereign (the state of Idaho) acting in a most
sacred function (as constitutional trustee of public school endowment funds), compared to the
City’s claims in the present case, which involve one of the lowest sovereigns (a municipality)
acting in one of the least sacred functions (a purely private contract). With no “trustee
performing a high constitutional public duty,” the common law exemption to the statute of
limitations in Peterson does not apply to the City’s claims.
Other examples rejecting any common law exemption from the statute of limitations and
barring claims by governmental entities include actions to collect a transfer tax, to collect an
inheritance tax, to recover fraudulently received public funds, and to recover fraudulently
received unemployment benefits. See White v. Conference Claimants Endowment Commission
of the Idaho Annual Conference of the Methodist Church, 81 Idaho 17 (1959); Hagan v. Young,
64 Idaho 318 (1942); Bannock County v. Bell, 8 Idaho 1, 65 P. 710 (1901); Norton v. Department
of Employment, 94 Idaho 924, 926 (1972). If all these examples fall short of the “high

18

See R. Vol. I., p. 77.
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constitutional public duty” required to exempt claims from the statute of limitations, the City’s
private contractual claim to acquire a gravel pit from HK falls even shorter.
F.

Public Policy Supports Application Of The Statute Of Limitations To Bar The City’s
Claims.
Public policy arguments come into play only where the statute is ambiguous and the court

may then consider the reasonableness of the proposed construction, the public policy underlying
the statute, and the legislative history of the statute. See, e.g., KGH Development, LLC, v. City of
Ketchum, 149 Idaho 524, 528 (2010). Here, the District Court found Section 5-216
unambiguous,19 so public policy is not a proper consideration. Nonetheless, the City offers
several public policy arguments to support its proposed interpretation of Section 5-216, listing
among its “parade of horribles,” the need for cities to become more “aggressive, assertive, and
perhaps litigious to protect the public’s rights,” resulting in waste of public resources.20
However, these public policy considerations, if considered at all, are offset by the public policy
supporting statutes of limitation, which includes “‘protection of defendants against stale claims,
and protection of the courts against needless expenditures of resources.’ Statutes of limitation
are designed to promote stability and avoid uncertainty with regards to future litigation.”
Wadsworth v. Dept. of Transp., 128 Idaho 439, 442 (1996) (quotation omitted).
As further explained by the Supreme Court of the United States, “Statutes of
limitations…are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale
claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
F:\CLIENTS\BJD\9109 - HK Contractors, Inc\Appeal\Respondent's Brief.doc

Page 11 of 13

died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost…They represent a public policy about the
privilege to litigate.” Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314, 65 S.Ct. 1137,
1142, 89 L.Ed. 1628 (1945)).
More directly, as the District Court explained, “It may be true that in certain scenarios,
public policy would preclude a party from avoiding its contractual obligations. However, it is
also long-held Idaho public policy to prevent a party who ‘sleeps on his rights’ from avoiding the
application of the statute of limitations.”21
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the district court’s order dismissing
the City’s complaint.
RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED this 28th day of September, 2017.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

By:

\s\B. J. Driscoll
B. J. Driscoll
Attorneys for Respondent,
HK Contractors, Inc.

19

See R. Vol. I., p. 75.
See pp. 26-27 of Appellant’s Brief.
21
See R. Vol. I., p. 78 (quoting Davis v. Consol. Wagon & Mach. Co., 43 Idaho 730, 254 P. 523, 524 (1927)).
20
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28th day of September, 2017, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to be served, by placing the same in a
sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery,
facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following:
[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile Transmission
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[XX] Hand Delivery
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box
[XX] Email: rfife@idahofallsidaho.gov
[XX] Email: mkirkham@idahofallsidaho.gov

Randall D. Fife
Michael A. Kirkham
City of Idaho Falls
375 D Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401

\s\B. J. Driscoll
B. J. Driscoll
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